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1. Introduction
The efficiency of the bankruptcy process has been
the subject of extensive debate among academics,
practitioners and policymakers (e.g. Lightman,
1996; Chew et al., 2004). The study of bankruptcy
costs is important because it sheds important light
on the efficiency of the bankruptcy process (Ferris
and Lawless, 2000; Franks and Sussman, 2005).
There is increasing recognition of the need to con-
sider different types of firms in this context since
their heterogeneity may also be reflected in the na-
ture of the distress process and its outcomes (Ferris
and Lawless, 2000; Franks and Sussman, 2005; Bris
et al., 2004). A number of studies, primarily focused
on public corporations in the US and Canada, show
substantial variation in the direct costs of distress,
although several suggest that the administrative fees
in Chapter 11 bankruptcies have been of the order of
7.5% of the liquidation value of the bankrupt firm’s
assets (Ang et al., 1982; Weiss, 1990; Betker, 1997;
Tashjian et al., 1996; Lubben, 2000; Fisher and
Martel, 2001; Bris et al., 2004).
Andrade and Kaplan (1998) examine a sample
of 31 formerly publicly listed corporations in the
US that were taken private in highly leveraged
transactions (HLTs) in which management ob-
tained an equity interest and which subsequently
became distressed. The costs of financial distress
in these firms amounted to 10–23% of firm value.
Betker (1997) finds that the ratio of direct costs of
bankruptcy to assets for traditional Chapter 11
cases is lower if the firm is an HLT than for dis-
tressed firms in general and suggests that this is
because HLTs reduce creditor coordination prob-
lems. Franks and Sussman (2005) provide detailed
analysis of 542 small UK firms in bankruptcy and
distress, concluding that the direct costs of bank-
ruptcy appear to be relatively high, with a mean
ranging between 24.3% and 42.4% (median 18.5%
to 26.8%) of total bankruptcy proceeds. Franks
and Sussman conclude that these costs are higher
than those found by Thorburn (2000) for Sweden.
This paper extends analysis by focusing on the
costs of the bankruptcy process related to manage-
ment buy-outs (MBOs). MBOs have higher failure
rates than firms generally.1 They may provide a
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1 On the basis of data in www.berr.gov.uk/files/file/10698.pdf,
‘Companies in 2001–2002’, specifically Tables A1 and C2,
which we adjusted for the number of dormant companies, we
estimate the overall annual receivership rate of all active com-
panies to be about 0.2% in 2000. On the basis of Centre for
Management Buy-out Research (CMBOR) data, the percent-
age of outstanding MBO/MBIs that failed in 2000 was 1.9%
(104 receiverships divided by 5,474 non-exited deals). Since
deals selected for buy-out are likely to be riskier than all ac-
tive companies generally, because they are more likely to be
underperforming and generally have higher leverage, a higher
receivership rate is to be expected.
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stronger test of the efficiency of the bankruptcy
process for three main reasons. First, MBOs may
help to shed light on the ‘lazy banking’ critique
that over-secured creditors have little incentive to
control the costs of the bankruptcy process
(Manove et al., 2001; Franks and Sussman, 2005;
Mokal, 2004). MBOs are typically highly lever-
aged and their banks are less likely to be over-se-
cured than with other firms since there may be
greater reliance on stable cash flows than asset se-
curity (Kaplan and Stein, 1993).2 Second, MBOs
shed light on the coordination costs in the distress
process arising from the presence of more than one
secured creditor and on whether senior secured
lenders take advantage of other secured lenders.
MBOs provide an interesting context in which to
test hypotheses relating to the number of creditors
since, unlike private firms generally in the UK
(Franks and Sussman, 2005), many of them are fi-
nanced by multiple lenders (Citron et al., 1997).
MBOs will be more likely to involve multiple
lenders since lenders will seek to spread the finan-
cial risk from the higher leverage. An additional
incentive for this lending structure is provided by
the heightened operational risk of MBOs due to
the fact that these entrepreneurs will not have prior
owner-manager experience. Third, in contrast to
Franks and Sussman (2005) MBOs may be more
highly leveraged. Following Jensen (1989), de-
fault should occur when more going concern value
is preserved. Hence, it would be expected that
MBOs will have lower costs of distress and more
going concern sales when they enter distress than
firms with lower leverage. A study of highly
geared MBOs is particularly of current interest in
view of the recent growth of highly leveraged pri-
vate equity transactions. Regulators have high-
lighted excessive leverage and the associated high
risks of default as one of the most significant risks
arising from these deals (FSA, 2006). This re-
search provides early evidence of the scale and de-
terminants of bankruptcy costs likely to be
incurred when such defaults occur.
We study bankruptcy costs for a sample of
MBOs in receivership. Three dimensions of bank-
ruptcy costs are examined. First, we examine the
impact on creditor recovery rates of potential coor-
dination costs arising from the presence of multi-
ple lenders. Second, we analyse bankruptcy costs
in the form of fees paid to the receivers plus other
direct receivership costs. Finally, we consider the
length of the receivership, which Bris et al. (2004)
argue is a good indicator of the efficiency of the
process, suggesting in particular that indirect
bankruptcy costs, such as bankruptcy’s adverse
impact in product and capital markets, increase
with the time spent in bankruptcy.
To address these issues, we survey the popula-
tion of MBOs in the UK completed in the period
1990–1995 that subsequently went into financial
distress. Given the pattern of failures of MBOs, es-
pecially those in the cohort covered in this study
(Figure 1), our sample companies generally in-
volve smaller MBOs. We hand-collected a unique
dataset specifically for this study from the records
of the receivers involved in each case. The detailed
nature of data collection has typically meant that
sample sizes in studies of financial distress have
been quite small, ranging from 11 (Warner, 1977)
to 108 (Gilson, 1997) with a mean size of less than
50. An exception is the study by Franks and
Sussman (2005) which used a sample of 542 firms.
Accordingly, our main final set of 57 firms is in
line with the majority of studies in this area.
We provide data on the receivership process and
the financial characteristics of the firms in re-
ceivership. Our main conclusions do not support
the argument that multiple lenders create ineffi-
ciencies resulting in significantly lower secured
creditor recovery rates. However, an important
new finding is that there is strong evidence that,
when there are multiple secured lenders, the senior
secured lender gains at the expense of other se-
cured creditors. This finding extends previous re-
search, showing that secured lenders take
advantage of unsecured lenders. Our results also
support the view that receivership costs do con-
sume a significant percentage of the receivership
proceeds. When trading costs incurred during the
course of the receivership are excluded, mean di-
rect receivership costs equal 30% of net receiver-
ship proceeds for our final sample of 57 firms with
cost data. Continuing trading costs themselves
comprise 29% of gross receivership proceeds.
Also, the receivership process can be long drawn
out, with an average length of 3.0 years for these
57 firms, and is substantially longer than this in a
significant minority of cases. However, the bulk of
the receiver’s work of repaying secured debt is
usually completed far earlier, with 95% of repay-
ments being made on average within 1.9 years. In
addition, we find some economic rationale for the
level of receivers’ fees and for length of receiver-
ship, although in common with both Ferris and
Lawless (2000) and Bris et al. (2004) the cost find-
ings vary depending on which measure of costs is
used. With this caveat, we find that receivers’ fees
are positively related to the proportion of secured
debt repaid, and also have some evidence to sup-
port the scale effect thesis that the relative signifi-
cance of receivers’ fees declines as firm size
grows. Regarding receivership length, receiver-
ships last longer the larger the amount of debt
72 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
2 Moir and Sudarsanam (2007) find that, in 1999, financial
loan covenants for borrowers in general were predominantly
non-cash flow based, consistent with lenders placing less re-
liance on cash flows for these borrowers.
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owed to the secured lenders.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows.
The next section sets out the institutional context.
Section 3 sets out the previous literature and hy-
pothesis development, and Section 4 the data and
methodology. Descriptive statistics are set out in
Section 5. Section 6 contains our main results, fol-
lowed by our conclusions.
2. Institutional framework
This study focuses on administrative receivership.
The Insolvency Act 1986 in the UK introduced
court-administered procedures similar to Chapter
11 in the US. However, holders of floating charges,
which are charges over assets that are changing in
nature, such as stocks or work in progress, have
the power to veto these procedures. Administrative
receivership can be instigated only by a creditor
whose security is held as a floating charge (Franks
et al., 1996). Administrative receivers owe their
main duty of care to the floating charge holder that
appointed them; they have few obligations to oth-
ers. A floating charge gives the holder powers of
control but not priority in the disbursement of pro-
ceeds; this is provided by holding a fixed charge
(Armour and Frisby, 2001; Mokal, 2003).
Importantly, the administrative receiver has
complete control over the firm. This power in-
cludes the ability to liquidate the business without
the permission of other creditors or the court.
Fixed-charge holders, who are creditors who hold
security over an identifiable corporate asset such
as real estate and who have the right to realise their
specific security in priority to any other claimants,
can constrain the activities of the receiver. As a re-
sult of the different powers attached to each
charge, creditors typically ensure that they hold
both fixed and floating charges (Sterling and
Wright, 1990).
3. Previous literature and hypothesis 
development
Firms involved in MBO transactions are tradition-
ally argued to have characteristics associated with
incentive misalignment and poor monitoring prior
to the buy-out, which results in significant agency
costs (Jensen, 1986). High leverage in MBO trans-
actions and its associated commitment to service
the debt form a central part of the panoply of gov-
ernance mechanisms aimed at reducing these
agency costs, alongside managerial equity hold-
ings and active private equity investors. There is a
well-known agency cost involved in the provision
of debt arising from potential conflicts of interest
between equity holders and debt providers (Smith
and Warner, 1979). These conflicts give rise to the
need for lenders to monitor management, a re-
quirement that extends to monitoring the adminis-
trative receivers who are in effect the management
during any insolvency process (Armour and
Frisby, 2001). A number of factors will affect the
efficiency of this monitoring process, key among
which is the number of secured creditors. The
presence of multiple secured creditors will give
rise to coordination problems, both before and
after the firm enters insolvency. However monitor-
ing efficiency can be improved either by there
being only one secured creditor or, if there are
multiple secured creditors, by concentrating con-
trol in the hands of a main creditor. On the other
hand a single creditor, if over-secured, could result
in poor control over bankruptcy costs, although the
Vol. 38 No. 1. 2008 73
Figure 1
Percentage of MBO/MBIs ending in receivership by deal value range and vintage year
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creditor’s desire to preserve its reputation may
counter-balance this. Company size is a further
variable to be taken into account as, thanks to scale
effects, receiverships are likely to be more effi-
cient the larger the firm.
The following sub-sections relate these issues to
three dimensions of bankruptcy costs – the extent
of inefficiency in secured debt recovery rates, the
determinants of receivers’ fees, and the length of
the receivership process.
3.1. Number of secured creditors and recovery
rates
The cost and efficiency of the receivership
process may be affected by the number of secured
creditors. Monitoring may be influenced by the
number of secured creditors that are present in a
particular deal (Bolton and Scharfstein, 1996;
Dennis and Mullineaux, 2000). The presence of
multiple creditors exacerbates information costs
and may result in collective under-investment in
information-gathering. In conditions of financial
distress, difficulties in getting agreement among
multiple secured creditors to sell may increase the
sale price required to persuade them to sell.
However, this may be more than offset by the un-
willingness of potential bidders to sink the costs of
becoming informed about the firm’s assets. The
greater the number of lenders in a loan syndicate,
the greater the potential conflicts of interest among
claim-holders (Wruck, 1990), the greater the rene-
gotiation costs associated with default (Smith,
1993) and the less likely private renegotiation of
financial distress is to be successful (Gilson et al.,
1990). Lee and Mullineaux (2004) find, using evi-
dence from listed corporations, that syndicates are
small and more concentrated when there is little
information about the borrower, when the credit
risk is relatively high and when the loan is secured,
so that syndicates tend to be structured to enhance
monitoring efforts and to facilitate renegotiation in
distress.
Multiple creditors
MBOs offer a particularly interesting context to
examine the impact of multiple secured creditors
on the efficiency of the bankruptcy process since
they are more likely than other private firms to
have multiple secured lenders. Jensen (1989) sug-
gests that because in MBOs lenders often hold
claims across seniority classes, the coordination of
multiple creditors may be reduced as compared to
non-buy-out cases, although this benefit may be
lower where public high yield debt is used (Kaplan
and Stein, 1993; Betker, 1997).
Where the presence of multiple secured lenders
to an MBO takes the form of a syndicate all pri-
mary contacts with the client are generally chan-
nelled through the lead (agent) bank so that
syndicate members have less influence on moni-
toring (Citron et al., 1997). This may lead to sig-
nificantly longer delays in implementing action
than in single creditor lending to buy-outs (Citron
et al., 1997). Such actions may also be less effec-
tive as a result of these greater coordination costs.
A multiplicity of secured creditors in buy-outs
may, therefore, lead to delayed corrective action
prior to receivership and adversely affect the con-
duct of the receivership when it occurs compared
to single creditor cases. Furthermore if different
creditors have different and possibly conflicting
priorities and objectives, the variety of pressures
on the receivers and the accompanying coordina-
tion problems may raise the costs of the bankrupt-
cy process and also result in a lower overall rate of
payout to the body of secured creditors.
Single creditors
Single secured creditors may avoid the coordina-
tion and other costs associated with multiple
lenders; thus they may be expected to lead to high-
er recovery rates and lower bankruptcy costs.
However, a single secured creditor may exercise
poorer control of receivers’ fees provided the cred-
itor obtains a reasonable repayment whereas the
presence of more than one secured creditor may
lead to more effective monitoring of receivership
costs and also the eventual amount of debt repaid.
Main secured creditors
It is possible to alleviate some of the coordina-
tion problems arising from multiple lenders
through creditor concentration where the main
creditor has the incentive to invest in monitoring
and the power to enforce default and renegotiation
(Diamond, 1984). This may lead to cheaper and
quicker enforcement and hence increase expected
returns to creditors. This main creditor role would
typically be undertaken by a bank. However, as the
main creditor bears a larger part of the total risk of
a firm’s failure, the benefits of concentration may
be outweighed by the costs, the larger the firm is.
Administrative receivership in the UK can be seen
as an efficient means of facilitating the bankruptcy
process by a concentrated creditor (Armour and
Frisby, 2001).
The role of the main secured creditor is especial-
ly important because the various strips of secured
debt finance in MBOs may be provided by differ-
ent types of lender (Jensen, 1989; Wright et al.,
1991). These strips may involve different priorities
and charges over assets. The presence of multiple
secured lenders may mean that an asset has more
than one floating charge over it. Priority among
equitable charges where the equities are otherwise
equal follows the rule in Dearle v Hall and the first
in time prevails (Farrar and Hanningan, 1998).
Hence, in the event of bankruptcy, if there is a
74 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
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shortfall in the proceeds from the sale of the asset,
later creditors may not receive as great a repay-
ment proportion as earlier ones. The main creditor
is likely to be the creditor that holds the first
charge over the assets.
We examine whether multiple lenders create in-
efficiencies that result in significantly lower se-
cured creditor recovery rates and control for other
factors that are likely to affect these recovery rates.
Where a firm may be operationally viable under
new ownership, a going-concern sale is more like-
ly and, in such cases, the receiver is expected to be
able to make higher payments to secured creditors
than where the assets are sold piecemeal. In addi-
tion it is expected that repayments will be higher,
the lower the proportion of inventories to total as-
sets, since inventories tend to be firm-specific and 
relatively illiquid, and the less weak the MBO’s 
financial structure. Due to the greater restructuring
complexities associated with larger MBOs, we ex-
pect firm size to be negatively associated with 
secured creditor repayments. Finally, the greater liq-
uidity of the market for corporate assets during
times of economic growth suggests that repayments
will be higher during economic upswings (Shleifer
and Vishny, 1992; Franks and Torous, 1994).
3.2. Determinants of receivership costs
Previous bankruptcy cost studies have investi-
gated the determinants of costs scaled by firms’ as-
sets, claims and bankruptcy distributions (Ferris
and Lawless, 2000; Bris et al., 2004). A number of
studies that have found scale effects have been
limited in terms of sample size and sector covered.
Warner (1977) found evidence of a scale effect but
this study was limited to only 11 firms in the rail-
road industry. Guffey and Moore (1991) also
found evidence of a scale effect in their study of
the trucking industry, while Ang et al. (1982) find
a scale effect in a sample of firms based on one ju-
dicial district. In contrast, Weiss (1990) in a more
comprehensive study of publicly traded corpora-
tions found no evidence of a scale effect to bank-
ruptcy costs.
Asset-based results are often considered less ro-
bust, possibly because asset valuations are less re-
liable (Ferris and Lawless, 2000: 9). This study
looks at receivers’ fees both in total and scaled by
three alternative size measures – (i) by the amount
of secured debt due at the start of the receivership;
(ii) by the net proceeds of the receivership defined
as repayments to the secured creditors plus re-
ceivership costs (a measure similar to that used by
Franks and Sussman, 2005). Receivership costs
comprise disbursements for receivers’ fees plus
other direct receivership costs such as legal,
agents’ and valuers’ fees. Salaries and other trad-
ing expenses incurred by the receiver are ignored
on the grounds that they are not strictly incremen-
tal; and (iii) by the gross proceeds of the receiver-
ship which includes salaries and other trading
costs, as the amounts involved are large and are
likely to vary depending on the manner in which
the receivership is managed. The first scaled meas-
ure is used as an indicator of the size of the task
facing the receiver (an ‘input’ measure) and the
latter two as measures of the results of the re-
ceivership (an ‘output’ measure).
Mode of sale
Fees are expected to be related to the mode by
which the receiver is able to dispose of the compa-
ny. Asset fire sales may depress the price at which
assets are sold (Pulvino, 1998; Stromberg, 2000).
LoPucki (1983) suggests lower prices from piece-
meal disposals as firms that reorganise rather than
liquidate lead to greater repayment of debt. Selling
firms as going concerns may generate higher
prices. Going-concern sales may take place quick-
ly, so associated costs should be lower. However,
disposing of a firm that has entered receivership
may require the expenditure of effort to repackage
the firm to enable it to be sold as a going concern.
Further significant costs may then be involved in
searching for and agreeing a price with a purchas-
er who is convinced that the firm is indeed viable.
In contrast, selling assets piecemeal may be less
problematical in the presence of active markets for
assets.
Firm size
Fees are expected to be higher the larger the
MBO. Larger MBOs are likely to be more com-
plex, so resulting in higher fees. However, as firm
size grows, scaled fees are expected to fall due to
efficiencies in the conduct of larger receiverships
and possibly the presence of fixed cost elements in
the make-up of receivers’ fees. This is the ‘scale
effect’ hypothesis for which there is only limited
evidence in previous research (Ferris and Lawless,
2000, and previous studies cited in their note 76).
Number of secured creditors
In the previous section we discussed how a multi-
plicity of secured creditors could adversely affect
the costs of the receivership. However, in a market
involving repeated transactions between a limited
number of players, reputation is important (Black
and Gilson, 1998). Lead members of lending 
syndicates, as agents for the other members, may 
be under greater pressure to act efficiently in order
to maintain their reputation (Chemmanur and
Fulghieri, 1994). Failure to do so may make it diffi-
cult to attract syndicate members in subsequent
transactions. Hence, receivership fees may not be
significantly higher with multiple secured creditors.
Type of receiver
More expert receivers with greater reputations,
Vol. 38 No. 1. 2008 75
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such as members of major international account-
ing firms,3 may be able to conduct the process
more efficiently and so charge lower fees, both in
total and on a scaled basis.
Length of receivership
Receivers’ fees (the main component of re-
ceivership costs – see Table 3) are often time-
based (Lightman, 1996). In addition other direct
receivership costs may be expected to mount up as
a receivership continues. In support of this, Bris et
al. (2004), Franks and Sussman (2005) and
Thorburn (2000) find a link between time spent in
bankruptcy and cost of bankruptcy.4 Therefore a
positive relation is expected between fees and
length of receivership.
State of the economy
The liquidity of markets for corporate assets will
be reduced in times of recession (Shleifer and
Vishny, 1992; Franks and Torous, 1994). Both the
cash flow and the number of potential industry
buyers will be lower, so that more effort will be re-
quired on the part of the receiver to achieve an
asset realisation price close to their value in best
use. As a result we expect receivership costs to be
higher in times of recession.
Proportion of secured debt repaid
The lazy banking hypothesis implies that credi-
tor banks fail to adequately control bankruptcy
costs. This will especially be the case when banks
are over-secured as they will then expect to recov-
er a high proportion, if not all, of their debt irre-
spective of the level of costs incurred. This view is
in line with Franks and Sussman’s (2005) conclu-
sion that the relatively high direct costs of bank-
ruptcy in the UK are consistent with the lazy
banking thesis that banks have little incentive to
control costs once their own liquidation rights
have been secured. We investigate this thesis for
our sample of highly leveraged MBO firms with
which banks are less likely to be over-secured. For
such firms, therefore, we expect the banks to be in-
centivised to control receivership costs. This effi-
ciency argument implies that costs are not
excessive but are based to some degree on the ef-
fectiveness of the receivership and that there
should therefore be a positive relation between
costs and the proportion of secured debt repaid.
3.3. Determinants of length of receivership
We have the following expectations regarding
the determinants of receivership length.
Mode of sale
The length of receivership is expected to be re-
lated to the mode by which the receiver is able to
dispose of the company. Going-concern sales may
take place more quickly. However, repackaging a
firm so that it can be sold as a going concern and
identifying a suitable purchaser is likely to be
more time-consuming than selling assets piece-
meal where there are active markets for assets.
Number of secured creditors
As with receivers’ fees above, coordination
problems with more than one secured creditor may
be expected to lead to longer receiverships. On the
other hand, if multiple creditors are able to exer-
cise more effective control, then they may be asso-
ciated with shorter receiverships.
Proportion of secured debt repaid
If longer receiverships are associated with
greater inefficiencies and complexities, then they
will also be associated with lower rates of secured
debt repayments.
Amount of secured debt due at start of receivership
Bris et al. (2004) provide weak evidence that
larger bankruptcies take longer to complete. We
therefore expect that the greater the amount of debt
due at the outset of the receivership, the longer the
receivership is expected to last.
State of the economy
It is expected that the liquidity of markets for
corporate assets is likely to be reduced in times of
recession (Shleifer and Vishny, 1992; Franks and
Torous, 1994), thus making it harder for receivers
to realise assets at prices they would like to
achieve. Due to these difficulties characteristic of
recessions, receiverships commencing during peri-
ods of economic downturn are expected to take
longer to complete.
4. Data and methodology
The study involved the compilation of a novel
dataset of MBOs completed in the period 1990 and
1995 that had subsequently entered receivership.
This period was selected as it allowed sufficient
time for failures to emerge and for the completion
of the receivership process in a significant propor-
tion of cases. The Centre for Management Buy-out
Research (CMBOR) database was used to identify
the cohort of buy-outs. The CMBOR database is
compiled from a wide range of sources including
twice-yearly surveys of private equity and debt
providers to buy-outs,5 press releases by these fin-
76 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
3 At the time of our study, this group involved the Big Six
firms but this has now been reduced to the Big Four.
4 However, Ferris and Lawless (2000) find only a weak pos-
itive relation in the US between time in reorganisation and
bankruptcy costs.
5 These surveys generally obtain a 100% response rate from
all the financiers active in the buy-out market as they receive
a free copy of a quarterly review of aggregate market trends
based on the data they supply which is recognised as the lead-
ing source of information in the market.
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anciers, the financial press, stock exchange circu-
lars issued by companies divesting subsidiaries as
MBOs and companies’ annual reports. The data-
base has no lower size cut-off and is unique in ef-
fectively representing the universe of buy-outs in
the UK. Data on failures of buy-outs and buy-ins
are collected by CMBOR from its regular surveys
of participants in the buy-out market, Companies
House returns and Extel, monitoring of the finan-
cial press and the London Gazette.
From Companies House we obtained microfich-
es for 226 of the 402 MBO receivership cases
identified on the CMBOR database. The total of
402 receiverships represents 11.7% of the 3,436
buy-outs identified by CMBOR in this period.6 Of
these, 161 were found to be unsuitable for analysis
for a number of reasons such as lack of data on ap-
pointment of the receiver or absence of receivers’
receipts and payments accounts; receiver appoint-
ed very recently; some cases of voluntary liquida-
tions; problems with establishing correct company
identity; or the receivership was still continuing at
the time our analysis was undertaken and it was
likely that further amounts would be realised for
the secured creditors. We therefore identified 65
cases where the receivership process was complete
but of this total, cost of receivership data were not
available for eight firms. The detailed direct cost
analysis in this paper, therefore, relates to the re-
maining 57 cases where the receivership process
was complete, with the company having been
struck off or, while technically continuing, the re-
ceiver had filed the final receipts and payments ac-
counts or the receivers informed us directly that
the receivership was effectively complete.
Data on the number of secured creditors and the
amounts owing to each are obtained from the di-
rectors’ Statements of Affairs. All amounts due to
secured creditors include accrued interest. The
mode of sale of the MBO by the receivers and the
identity of the receivers are obtained from the re-
ceivers’ report to the creditors. The amount of se-
cured debt repaid by the receivers, the receivers’
fees and the on-going trading expenditures are de-
termined from the receivers’ annual receipts and
payments accounts. The value of the MBO at the
date it is set up is taken from the CMBOR database
or from the value of total assets less current liabil-
ities from the first published balance sheet subse-
quent to the MBO being established.
Accounting data from the MBOs’ published fi-
nancial statements are available for only a subset
of 42 cases in our population. Where more than
one set of accounts is available, the last set prior to
the appointment of the receivers is used.
5. Descriptive statistics
As shown in Table 1, the period until formal termi-
nation of the receivership is no longer than three
years in the majority (63%) of cases. In some
cases, however, this period can be substantially
longer and in 10% of our 65 cases it exceeds six
years. Table 2 (which covers the 57 cases for
which we have full data for our costs tests) shows,
however, that very little significant activity occurs
beyond year three in terms of secured debt repay-
ment, payment of receivers’ fees and other direct
receivership costs, or the incurring of trading costs
by the receiver. By the end of the third year, on av-
erage 98.3% of debt repayments have been made,
92.8% of fees and 96.3% of other receivership
costs have been paid and 92.6% of trading costs
have been disbursed. Due to the lack of apparent
activity in the later formal years of lengthy re-
ceiverships, in some tests we use an alternative in-
dicator to measure the ‘effective’ length of the
receiverships. This is deemed to be the year by
which 95% of the secured debt repayments have
been made. Table 1 shows that almost one-half of
the 65 receiverships are effectively completed ac-
cording to this measure during their first year, and
89.2% are completed in this sense by year three.
Direct receivership costs are evaluated both in
relation to the amount of secured debt owing at the
start of the receivership, which can be viewed as a
measure of the size of the job facing the receivers
at the outset, and in relation to receivership pro-
ceeds, which is used as a measure of output from
the receivership process. Receivership proceeds
comprise payments to the secured creditors plus
receivers’ fees and other direct receivership costs,7
with alternative measures either including (gross
proceeds) or excluding (net proceeds) on-going
trading expenditures, as explained in Section 3.2
above.8 Receivers’ fees plus other direct receiver-
ship costs are equivalent to just over one-quarter of
secured debt owing (Table 3, Panel A) and account
on average for 30% of net receivership proceeds
(Table 3, Panel B), which is within the range found
by Franks and Sussman (2005).9 After allowing for
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6 Some 26 of the buy-outs completed in this period involved
public to private transactions (0.8%), of which six had entered
receivership by the end of 2006. See footnote 1 for details of
overall receivership rates compared to overall MBO receiver-
ships.
7 Other receivership costs total £43,600 on average (median
£23,600), with legal fees accounting for 61.5% of these,
agents’ and valuers’ fees 29.6% and receivers’ expenses, in-
cluding advertising, 8.9%.
8 Repayments to preferential creditors are not included due
to lack of reliable data. Franks and Sussman (2005) have these
data for only part of their sample, and for these cases pay-
ments to the preferential creditors amount on average to only
4.9% (median = 1.1%) of total proceeds. To this extent, there-
fore, our measures of receivership costs to total proceeds may
be overstated.
9 Our finding of direct receivership costs comprising 30%
of net receivership proceeds (i.e. of liquidation value) con-
trasts with only 19.1% reported on the same basis by Thorburn
(2000) in Sweden where the regime is somewhat different.
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receivership and other fees, secured debt repaid
amounts to a mean of 70% of net proceeds. Other
continuing trading disbursements are particularly
high, accounting for a mean of 51.4% and a medi-
an of 23.9% of total secured debt, with a mean of
56.9% and a median of 49% of total secured debt
being repaid (Table 3, Panel A). Continuing trad-
ing disbursements also account for 28.6% of gross
receivership proceeds, leaving approximately one-
half of both the mean and median gross proceeds
for the secured creditors (Table 3, Panel C).
Illustrative examples of the nature of receivers’ on-
going trading costs are shown in the Appendix.
As shown in Table 4, which encompasses the
companies with accounting data, the last accounts
prior to entering receivership not surprisingly
show these firms to have only a marginally posi-
tive median return on assets (2%) and a median in-
terest cover well below one (0.79). Ninety percent
of assets are funded by liabilities, and liquidity is
poor with a median acid test ratio value of only
0.68. Median fixed assets and debtors both account
for about 30% of total assets and the median value
of stocks to total assets is 21%. These assets could
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Table 1
Length of receivership
This table identifies the number and percentage of companies where the receivership has been completed by
year. We distinguish between actual and effective length of receivership. Effective length of receivership is de-
fined as elapsed time by which 95% of secured debt is repaid.
Actual length of Effective length of 
receivership receivership
No. of years No. of cases % of cases No. of cases % of cases
1 2 3.1 31 47.7
2 22 33.8 21 32.3
3 17 26.1 6 9.2
4 7 10.8 2 3.1
5 5 7.7 3 4.6
6 5 7.7 2 3.1
7 3 4.6 0 0.0
8 3 4.6 0 0.0
9 0 0.0 0 0.0
10 1 1.5 0 0.0
Total 65 100.0 65 100.0
Table 2
Receivership activity over period of receivership
This table identifies the mean percentages of secured debt repaid, receivers’ fees and other receivership costs
paid and trading costs paid in each year of the receivership.
Year Mean percentage Mean percentage Mean percentage Mean percentage 
of secured debt of receivers’ fees of other receivership of trading costs 
repaid in year paid in year costs paid in year paid in year
1 73.7 69.4 77.5 79.3
2 17.0 17.7 13.0 9.8
3 7.6 5.7 5.8 3.5
4 0.9 3.2 0.3 2.2
5 0.5 0.2 1.4 1.4
6 0.3 1.2 2.0 0.9
7 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.2
8 0.0 2.3 0.0 2.3
9 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.2
10 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1
N=57
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potentially provide security for further borrowings
by these firms, but it should be remembered that
all the firms already have secured debt and data are
not available on the proportion of free assets still
available.
Table 5 provides additional descriptive statistics
on the sample and indicates the distinctiveness of
MBOs.10 Franks and Sussman (2005) show mean
recovery rates for their three banks ranging be-
tween 73.8% and 76.7%. We have a much lower
mean recovery rate at 57% (Table 5, Panel A).
Also in contrast to Franks and Sussman who find
that for one of their banks the median recovery rate
is 100%, in only 14 (25%) of our cases do the se-
cured creditors get a 100% repayment, indicating
that over-security does not seem to be widespread.
Also 20 (35%) cases have more than one secured
creditor, whereas Franks and Sussman’s compa-
nies tend to have only the one ‘main’ bank. Over
two thirds (70.2 %) of firms were sold piecemeal
with the balance being sold either as a going con-
cern (10 cases, 17.5%) or part going concern and
part piecemeal (7 cases, 12.3%). Scoring a partial
going-concern sale as half, the overall rate of
going-concern realisations is 24%, substantially
lower than the 44% found by Franks and Sussman
(2005). Median receivership costs in those firms
sold piecemeal were significantly smaller (but
only weakly so, at the 10% level) than for other
forms of sale (Table 5, Panel B). The companies
are evenly divided in terms of whether the receiv-
er was part of a major international (Big Six) ac-
counting firm.11
6. Results
6.1. Cost impact of number of secured creditors
6.1.1. Univariate analysis
We first investigate the identities of the secured
creditors for the 57 cases with data availability. As
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Table 3
Receivership costs
Panel A analyses the percentage of total secured debt due accounted for by receivers’ fees, other receivership
costs, receivership trading costs and repayment of secured debt. Panel B analyses net receivership proceeds be-
tween receivers’ fees, other receivership costs and secured debt repayments. Panel C analyses gross proceeds
among receivers’ fees, other receivership costs, receivership trading costs and secured debt repayments.
Panel A. As a percentage of total secured debt due
Mean Median
Receivers’ fees 19.4 13.7
Other receivership costs 6.7 4.8
Receivership trading costs 51.4 23.9
Repayment of secured debt 56.9 49.1
Panel B. As a percentage of net receivership proceeds
Mean Median
Receivers’ fees 22.3 19.9
Other receivership costs 7.7 6.0
Repayment of secured debt 70.0 73.5
100.0
Panel C. As a percentage of gross receivership proceeds
Mean Median
Receivers’ fees 15.1 14.6
Other receivership costs 5.2 4.4
Receivership trading costs 28.6 27.9
Repayment of secured debt 51.1 50.4
100.0
N=57
10 The differences reported here between this study and
Franks and Sussman (2005) may also be due to this research
including exclusively firms in receivership while only 55% of
Franks and Sussman’s bankrupt firms entered receivership,
with the remainder entering administration, CVA or winding-
up (see their Table IV, p. 83). However Franks and Sussman
also report that they have not identified significant differences
in recovery rates between insolvency procedures, although
they also point out that banks are unlikely to permit proce-
dures other than receivership unless they expect them to gen-
erate higher recovery rates.
11 See explanation in footnote 3.
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80 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
Table 4
Financial characteristics of the firms in receivership
This table presents data on means, median, minimum, maximum and standard deviation of financial variables
used in the analysis. Sample size varies due to missing values of some variables.
N Mean Median Minimum Maximum Standard
deviation
Sales (£000s) 28 8945 4009 291 42201 10488.65
Total assets (£000s) 42 3612 1852 107 30212 5075.99
Operating profit/total assets 31 –0.02 0.02 –0.39 0.19 0.14
Interest cover 30 –2.80 0.79 –70.75 14.10 16.74
Total liabilities/total assets 42 0.92 0.90 0.47 2.19 0.32
Shareholders’ funds/total assets 42 0.08 0.10 –1.19 0.53 0.32
Current ratio 42 1.08 1.01 0.21 3.58 0.53
Acid test ratio 42 0.71 0.68 0.10 1.62 0.33
Fixed assets/total assets 42 0.34 0.29 0.00 0.88 0.23
Debtors/total assets 21 0.40 0.31 0.14 0.95 0.23
Stocks/total assets 42 0.21 0.21 0.00 0.69 0.17
Table 5
Descriptive statistics of variables associated with the receivership
Panel A in this table presents data on means, median, minimum, maximum and standard deviation of descrip-
tive statistics associated with receivership. Size of firm is measured in Size of firm = value of MBO at date it
was established or, if this not available, balance sheet value of total assets minus current liabilities. Panel B
presents analysis of differences in mean and median receivership fees plus direct receivership costs according
to mode of sale, number of secured creditors, size of receiver and amount of secured debt repaid. * = differ-
ence in means (weakly) significant at 10% level (two-tail test) using t test; difference in medians (weakly) sig-
nificant at 10% level using the Mann Whitney test.
Panel A: Firm size, receivership length, debt repaid
Standard
Mean Median Minimum Maximum deviation
(n=57)
Size of firm (£000s) 1938 650 4 16315 3273.18
Receivership length (days) 1101 877 9 3316 680.88
Effective length of receivership – 1.93 2.00 1.00 6.00 1.22
year by which 95% of secured
debt repaid
Proportion of secured debt repaid 0.57 0.49 0.01 1.00 0.34
Panel B: Differences in receivership costs (fees plus direct receivership costs) (£000s)
Receivership costs
N Mean Median
Going concern or mixed sale 17 210.7* 115.0*
Piecemeal sale 40 129.8* 74.7*
One secured creditor 37 152.4 101.0
More than one secured creditor 20 156.7 95.0
Big Six receiver 29 141.4 114.9
Non-Big Six receiver 28 166.8 69.3
100% of secured debt repaid 14 174.2 95.4
Less than 100% of secured debt 43 147.3 100.4
repaid
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already referred to in Table 5, 37 of these cases
have a sole secured creditor. In the remaining 20
cases, the senior secured lender is identified. In 15
of these cases the creditor classified here as the
senior secured lender was the first creditor to
legally register its security and also the first ap-
pointer of the receiver, and as such would be ex-
pected to have priority in repayment. In a further
three cases the first appointer of the receiver
(which in none of the cases was one of the top six
MBO lenders during the 1990 to 1995 period)12
had entered into an agreement with one of the most
active MBO lending banks to give that bank repay-
ment priority up to a specified sum in case of re-
ceivership. In these three cases the bank benefiting
from the priority agreement is classified here as
the senior secured lender.13 Finally, in the remain-
ing two cases the senior secured lender is identi-
fied as a creditor holding a fixed charge over
specific assets and to whom only a very small pro-
portion (less than 2% in both cases) of the total
outstanding secured debt is due. In both these
cases the senior secured lender is one of the active
MBO lenders, while the appointer of the receiver
is not. In summary, the creditor classified here as
the senior secured lender is either the first to ap-
point the receiver or one of the main MBO lending
banks which has protected itself in case of re-
ceivership either via a priority agreement with
other secured creditors or, when the debt due is rel-
atively small, by a fixed charge.
Table 6 shows the identities of the 57 main se-
cured lenders, these being either the sole secured
creditor or the senior secured lender (as defined
above) in multiple secured creditor cases. As can
be seen in 49 (86%) of the 57 cases, the senior se-
cured lender is one of the top six MBO lenders
during the 1990 to 1995 period. There are a further
26 secured lenders (in addition to the main lender)
in the 20 multiple creditor cases, among whom
only one name appears more than once, and with
only one appearance in this group by one of the top
six MBO lenders. It is thus clear that the large
banks and foremost MBO lenders are predomi-
nantly either the sole or the senior secured lender
to these MBOs.
As shown in Table 7, the mean repayment rate of
62% to sole secured creditors is, as expected,
greater than the overall repayment rate of 48% in
cases with more than one such creditor, a differ-
ence that is weakly significant at the 10% level 
(t = 1.587, p = .060 one-tailed test). Although the
overall repayment rate is lower in multiple secured
creditor cases, the senior secured lender in these
cases receives more (mean = 74%) than do single
secured creditors (mean = 62%), although this dif-
ference is not significant (t = –1.473, p = .147,
two-tailed). There is also no significant difference
between these groups on the basis of medians. Of
particular interest, however, is the finding that in
multiple creditor cases there is a highly significant
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Table 6
Identities of main secured lender
This table compares the relative importance of different secured lenders among our sample of receivership
cases with their rank in terms of all MBO deals completed. Rank of secured lenders by volume of deals done
is based on authors’ database of the population of buy-outs in the UK during this period, where 1 = most deals
done.
Secured lender Cases Rank by volume of MBO
deals 1990–1995
Number %
Barclays 15 26.3 3
Natwest 11 19.3 2
Lloyds 9 15.8 4
Midland 6 10.5 6
Bank of Scotland 4 7.0 1
Royal Bank of Scotland 4 7.0 5
Sub-total 49 85.9
Other banks (all one deal each) 8 14.1
Total 57 100.0
12 This ranking is based on an analysis of 1,550 MBO deals
that took place during this period (CMBOR analysis).
13 In one case, for example, the private equity backer which
had also provided debt appointed the receiver. The receivers’
report to the creditors states: ‘There is a priority agreement in
force between the two debenture holders which ranks
[Creditor A] ahead of [Creditor B, the private equity backer].
[Creditor A] have now been paid in full and there is an esti-
mated deficiency to [Creditor B] of £156,711.’
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difference between the mean 74% recovered by
the senior secured lender and that received by the
remaining secured creditors (mean = 32%) (t =
5.941, p = .000, one-tailed). This difference is even
more marked and strongly significant when using
median figures: 83% median recovery by the sen-
ior secured lender compared with 18% median re-
covery by the remaining secured creditors
6.1.2. Multivariate analysis
In Tables 8, 10, 11 and 12, we adopt OLS regres-
sion analysis. In Table 9 we undertake logistic es-
timation. We conduct tests for the normality of
standardised residuals using the Shapiro-Wilks
and Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests.14
Table 8 examines the relationship between the
number of secured creditors and amounts repaid to
these creditors, both in total (model 1) and to the
senior secured lender alone (model 2). These re-
gressions are for the 42 cases for which accounting
data are available. Although the overall regression
is not significant, model 1 indicates that the num-
ber of secured creditors has no impact on the over-
all amount of secured debt repaid, and is therefore
not shown to be a factor leading to greater ineffi-
ciency in the receivership process. However, going
concern sales do marginally (one-tailed test) lead
to higher repayments, as does a lower ratio of
stocks to total assets.15 In contrast, model 2 con-
firms that the percentage repayment to the senior
secured lender is significantly larger in cases
where there is more than one secured creditor.
However, the mode of sale is of no effect although,
contrary to expectations, there is some evidence
that recoveries by the senior secured creditor are
greater when the receiver is appointed in 1993 or
earlier, a period of economic downturn. This may
be because the senior creditor is more alert during
times of recession and initiates receivership earlier
so as to have a chance of achieving a greater re-
covery. The main overall conclusion from these
two models is, therefore, that in our sample of
MBO receiverships the number of secured credi-
tors does have a significant impact on the way in
which the total proceeds are apportioned among
the various secured creditors. When there is more
than one secured creditor, the senior secured
lender appears to achieve a significant priority, due
to the stronger nature of their security, and even to
some extent receives a higher rate of repayment
than do single creditors. There is also weak evi-
dence from model 1 that the number of secured
creditors does not affect the overall efficiency of
the process.
6.1.3 Determinants of number of secured creditors
To gain a further understanding of the different
repayment patterns for MBO receiverships with
more than one as compared with only one secured
creditor, a logistic analysis is performed to exam-
ine the variables associated with the presence of
more than one such creditor. As can be seen from
82 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
Table 7
Secured debt repayment rates
This table compares differences in secured debt repayment rates between single secured creditors and multiple
secured creditors. Significant differences in means and medians are identified as: a = difference in means be-
tween single secured creditor and all secured creditors in total significant at 0.10 level using t-test; b = differ-
ence in means between main secured creditor and other secured creditors significant at 0.000 level; c =
difference in medians between main secured creditor and other secured creditors significant at 0.001 using
Wilcoxon signed ranks tests).
Proportion of secured debt repaid
Mean Median
In cases with a single secured .618a .69
creditor (n = 37)
In cases with more than one
secured creditor (n = 20):
In total .479a .38
To main secured creditor .744b .83c
To other secured creditors .317b .18c
14 Neither test indicates a problem with non-normally dis-
tributed residuals in the reported regressions, with the excep-
tion of Table 10 model 2 and (marginally) Table 11 model 1
for which only the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test indicates no
problems.
15 In addition, the mean recovery rate for ‘speedy’ going
concern realisations is compared with that for ‘slow’ going
concern realisations to test for possible dissipation in value
among ‘slow’ cases. The mean realisation rate for the eight
cases completed faster than the median receivership length is
69.7%, compared with 63.7% for the nine cases taking longer
than the median length, but this difference is not statistically
significant (t = 0.346, p = .734 two-tailed test).
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ita
s D
ian
 N
us
wa
nto
ro
], 
[R
iri
h D
ian
 Pr
ati
wi
 SE
 M
si]
 at
 21
:03
 29
 Se
pte
mb
er 
20
13
 
Table 9, the presence of more than one secured
creditor is significantly associated with both heav-
ier reliance on liabilities for funding (i.e. low ratio
of shareholders’ funds to total assets) as well as
with higher proportions of fixed assets to total as-
sets. It seems, therefore, that MBOs seek secured
lending from more than one source when they
need to borrow a higher proportion of their total
funding and they have substantial amounts of fixed
assets against which they can offer appropriate se-
curity to lenders.
6.2. Determinants of receivers’ fees and other 
receivership costs
As shown in Table 10, there appears to be some
economic rationale for total receivership costs.
Costs, as measured by the log of total receivership
costs, are significantly higher the greater the pro-
portion of secured debt repaid. In cases where
100% of the secured debt is repaid there is weak
evidence of an association with higher costs.
These results are consistent with the efficiency ar-
gument that high costs do not come at the expense
of secured creditor recoveries. In addition, higher
receivership costs are significantly associated with
larger MBOs and with longer receiverships, as
measured by the log of receivership days, although
only weakly so in model 2. There is also some
weak evidence that the presence of a going con-
cern element in asset realisations is associated with
higher total cost levels. Contrary to expectations,
however, receiverships commencing in the post-
1993 economic growth period are significantly as-
sociated with higher total cost levels.16
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Table 8
Association between number of secured creditors and proportion of secured debt repaid
Dependent variable is proportion of secured debt repaid: In model 1: to all secured creditors. In model 2: to
only the senior secured lender. SALEMODE = 1 if going concern or mixed sale; = 0 otherwise. LOGSIZE =
natural log of value of MBO at date it was established or, if this not available, of balance sheet value of total
assets minus current liabilities. MULTCRS = 1 if more than one secured creditor; = 0 otherwise. STOCKTA =
stock/total assets in last balance sheet prior to receivership. SHFUNDTA = shareholders’ funds/total assets in
last balance sheet prior to receivership. ECON = 1 if receiver appointed in 1994 or later; = 0 if appointed in
1993 or earlier. Figures in parentheses are p values.
Variable Predicted sign Model 1 Model 2
Number of cases 42 42
Intercept ? 0.869 1.002
(.000) (.000)
SALEMODE + 0.159 0.044
(.145) (.651)
LOGSIZE – –0.022 –0.023
(.466) (.396)
MULTCRS – –0.077 0.252
(.494) (.017)
STOCKTA – –0.573 –0.586
(.075) (.047)
SHFUNDTA + 0.184 0.203
(.271) (.183)
ECON + –0.118 –0.218
(.385) (.082)
Adjusted R2 0.100 .222
F 1.759 2.947
F (sig) 0.137 .020
Note: The highest correlation among the independent variables is –0.187 between MULTCRS and SHFUNDTA.
16 As a robustness check the regressions in Table 10 are re-
run substituting the effective length of the receivership (the
year by which 95% of the secure debt is repaid) for the actual
length. Both regressions remain significant, with the coeffi-
cients relating to proportion of secured debt repaid, size of
MBO and going-concern asset realisations all retaining their
significance. The coefficient on effective receivership length
is significant only in model 1 (at the 5% level), indicating that
not only actual but also effective receivership length has some
association with higher receivership costs.
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Regarding the scaled cost models presented in
Table 11, there is strong evidence, particularly in
model 3, for a scale effect, with the proportion of
costs falling as firm size grows. In addition, as
shown in model 1, receivership costs increase as a
proportion of secured debt due, the greater the pro-
portion of that debt repaid, providing further sup-
port for the efficiency argument that where
receivership costs constitute a higher proportion of
the debt due this does not occur at the expense of
the secured creditors.17 Finally in models 2 and 3
the proportion of costs is significantly higher in
cases of only one secured creditor as compared
with cases having more than one secured credi-
tor.18
6.3. Determinants of length of receivership
Longer receiverships, as measured by the log of
the number of days, are as expected associated
with both a larger amount of secured debt owing
and with receiverships commencing during the
pre-1994 recession period (Table 12). Further in-
vestigation reveals that this economic cycle result
is entirely due to cases with piecemeal asset reali-
sations. The ten pre-1994 recession period piece-
meal realisation cases lasted over 80% longer than
the subsequent 34 growth-period piecemeal re-
ceiverships (mean length = 1,803.0 days versus
982.5 days, t = 2.777, p = .017). While the going-
concern/mixed realisation receiverships com-
mencing during the recession period also lasted
longer than the growth period cases, the difference
is not statistically significant (for the six pre-1994
cases mean length = 1,203.2 days versus 1,033.5
days for the 15 post-1993 cases, t = 0.620, p =
.543). It appears that it is piecemeal asset sales that
take significantly longer to achieve in times of re-
cession, while the time required for going-concern
realisations is unaffected by the economic cycle.
This could be because, in a recession, the piece-
meal realisation cases have been previously of-
fered for sale on a going-concern basis, but this
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Table 9
Variables associated with number of secured creditors
This table uses logistic regression to analyse the factors associated with the number of secured creditors.
Dependent variable = 1 if more than one secured creditor, = 0 otherwise; SHFUNDTA = shareholders’
funds/total assets in last balance sheet prior to receivership; FIXASSTA = fixed assets/total assets in last 
balance sheet prior to receivership; CURRENT = current ratio in last balance sheet prior to receivership; 
DUETOT = total amount of debt due to the secured lenders. Figures in parentheses are p values.
Variable Predicted sign Model
Number of cases 42
Intercept ? –4.372
(.036)
SHFUNDTA – –3.168
(.033)
FIXASSTA + 5.074
(.043)
CURRENT ? 2.418
(.099)
DUETOT + 0.000
(.692)
Model chi square 8.484
Chi square sig. 0.075
Nagelkerke R2 0.254
Note: The highest correlation among the independent variables is –0.503 between FIXASSTA and CURRENT.
17 The negative association, although not significant, with
proportion repaid in models 2 and 3 is likely to be a construct
of the use of proceeds for scaling, as both costs and debt re-
payments are used in the calculation of proceeds.
18 A further regression (not reported here) is run to ascertain
whether on-going trading costs are greater in instances associ-
ated with going concern asset realisations than where the re-
ceiver is operating the business on a minimal basis with a view
perhaps to only completing outstanding contracts. However,
the sole variable associated with receivership trading costs
(scaled by the total amount of secured debt due and then
logged)) is the proportion of secured debt repaid. It would
seem, therefore, that these trading costs do not detract from the
amounts available to repay secured creditors but, to the con-
trary, are associated with realising greater value from the re-
ceivership so that proportionally higher repayments can be
made to these creditors.
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has proved difficult, so that by the time the assets
are actually sold piecemeal a substantial amount of
time has passed. Finally, Table 12 also shows a
weak relationship between length of the receiver-
ship and the presence of a single secured creditor.
7. Conclusions
In this paper we have used a unique, hand-collect-
ed dataset of 65 MBOs in distress, producing a
final sample of 57 firms, to analyse the efficiency
of the bankruptcy process and in particular, the de-
terminants of bankruptcy costs. The first dimen-
sion of bankruptcy costs studied is the level of
secured creditor recovery rates. In particular, ex-
ploiting the fact that MBOs often have more than
one secured lender, we investigate whether the
presence of multiple secured creditors has a nega-
tive impact on recovery rates. Our findings do not
support the argument that multiple lenders create
inefficiencies resulting in significantly lower se-
cured creditor recovery rates. However, when there
are multiple secured lenders there is strong evi-
dence that, thanks to its strong priority achieved
via a variety of mechanisms, the senior secured
lender gains at the expense of other secured credi-
tors.
Secondly we examine direct receivership costs.
Our results support the view that these costs con-
sume a significant percentage of the receivership
proceeds, with both mean and median receivership
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Table 10
Variables associated with total receivership costs
This table uses OLS regression to examine the variables associated with total receivership costs (defined as re-
ceivers’ fees plus other direct receivership costs). Dependent variable in both models is natural log of total re-
ceivership costs. SALEMODE = 1 if going concern or mixed sale; = 0 otherwise. LOGSIZE = natural log of
value of MBO at date it was established or, if this not available, of balance sheet value of total assets minus
current liabilities. MULTCRS = 1 if more than one secured creditor; = 0 otherwise. RECTYPE = 1 if receiver
not a Big Six firm; = 0 otherwise. LOGRECDAYS = natural log of length of receivership in days. ECON = 1
if receiver appointed in 1994 or later; = 0 if appointed in 1993 or earlier. PROPPAID = proportion of secured
debt repaid by receivership. ALLPAID = 1 if 100% of secured debt repaid; = 0 otherwise. Figures in parenthe-
ses are p values.
Variable Predicted sign Model 1 Model 2
Number of cases 56 56
Intercept ? –2.896 –1.374
(.126) (.509)
SALEMODE + 0.438 0.569
(.105) (.062)
LOGSIZE + 0.242 0.246
(.002) (.004)
MULTCRS ? 0.089 –0.011
(.735) (.971)
RECTYP + 0.202 0.065
(.413) (.813)
LOGRECDAYS + 0.601 0.500
(.023) (.088)
ECON – 0.726 0.667
(.022) (.063)
PROPPAID + 1.599
(.000)
ALLPAID + 0.655
(.069)
Adjusted R2 0.400 0.241
F 6.249 3.493
F (sig) 0.000 0.004
Note: The highest correlation among the independent variables is –0.299 between LOGRECDAYS and ECON.
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costs equal to about 20% of total receivership pro-
ceeds for our sample of 57 firms with cost data,
while continuing trading costs consume a further
29% of total receivership proceeds. We find that
direct receivership costs, both absolute and scaled
by the amount of debt due, are positively related to
the proportion of secured debt repaid, lending sup-
port to the efficiency argument that secured credi-
tor recoveries do not suffer at the expense of high
receivership costs. This finding is consistent with
the expectation that our sample of MBO firms,
being highly leveraged, are unlikely to be over-se-
cured, resulting in the lenders having relatively
strong incentives to control bankruptcy costs. In
addition, consistent with the scale hypothesis, we
find that the relative level of receivers’ fees de-
clines as firm size grows.
The final dimension of receivership costs inves-
tigated is receivership length. We find that the av-
erage length is 3.0 years and is substantially longer
in a significant minority of cases. However, 95%
of secured creditor repayments are made on aver-
age within the substantially shorter period of 1.9
years, thus mitigating potential indirect costs
brought about by excessively long receiverships.
Finally, we find that receiverships last longer, the
larger the amount of debt owed to the secured
lenders, and when the receivership commences
during economic recession, apparently due to the
length of time needed to make piecemeal realisa-
tions when the economy is weak.
Our findings complement and extend the de-
bate concerning the nature of the bankruptcy
regime in court-based versus contract-driven sys-
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Table 11
Variables associated with scaled receivership costs
This table uses OLS regression to examine the variables associated with scaled receivership costs. Dependent
variable in model 1 is the natural log of receivership costs scaled by total secured debt due; in model 2 receiver-
ship costs scaled by gross receivership proceeds (defined as repayments to secured creditors plus receivership
costs plus ongoing trading costs during the receivership); in model 3 the natural log of receivership costs scaled
by net receivership proceeds (defined as repayments to secured creditors plus receivership costs). SALEMODE
= 1 if going concern or mixed sale; = 0 otherwise. LOGSIZE = natural log of value of MBO at date it was es-
tablished or, if this not available, of balance sheet value of total assets minus current liabilities. MULTCRS = 1
if more than one secured creditor; = 0 otherwise. RECTYPE = 1 if receiver not a Big Six firm; = 0 otherwise.
LOGRECDAYS = the natural log of length of receivership in days. ECON = 1 if receiver appointed in 1994
or later; = 0 if appointed in 1993 or earlier. PROPPAID = proportion of secured debt repaid by receivership.
Figures in parentheses are p values.
Variable Predicted sign Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Number of cases 55 56 55
Intercept ? 0.272 0.742 –0.372
(.888) (.001) (.603)
SALEMODE + 0.066 0.012 0.130
(.808) (.686) (.394)
LOGSIZE – –0.136 –0.017 –0.094
(.072) (.052) (.026)
MULTCRS ? –0.180 –0.062 –0.379
(.506) (.044) (.012)
RECTYP + –0.023 –0.006 0.054
(.928) (.840) (.702)
LOGRECDAYS + –0.305 –0.051 –0.038
(.250) (.088) (.682)
ECON – –0.171 –0.023 0.136
(.599) (.510) (.425)
PROPPAID + 1.899 –0.074 –0.191
(.000) (.102) (.391)
Adjusted R2 0.377 0.111 0.144
F 5.659 1.981 2.299
F (sig) 0.000 0.077 0.042
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tems (see, for example, Franks et al., 1996, and
Davydenko and Franks, 2005). Jensen (1989) has
argued for the efficacy of the latter over the for-
mer, citing leveraged and MBOs as examples of
such transactions. He argues that high leverage
promotes closer monitoring of management and
hence is likely to result in a speedier and more ef-
ficient response when problems occur. US evi-
dence relating to the court-based Chapter 11
process, suggests that the direct costs of bank-
ruptcy are lower where the firm is a highly lever-
aged transaction (Betker, 1997). There is
evidence that banks lending to MBOs typically
establish specialist departments to monitor these
transactions which are recognised as requiring
different skills in structuring and monitoring
compared to other forms of corporate lending
(Citron et al., 1997). However, high levels of
leverage also increase financial risk and banks
are less likely to be as over-secured as in private
lending generally. This study has investigated
those MBOs which, despite the presence of spe-
cialised lender monitoring, nevertheless entered
formal insolvency procedures. These cases,
therefore, will have been the ones considered
most difficult to reorganise. This is consistent
with our findings that, in comparison with Franks
and Sussman’s (2005) more general population of
small firms, these MBOs experienced fewer
going-concern realisations in receivership, made
a lower average repayment to secured creditors
and made fewer 100% repayments to these cred-
itors. These results also contrast with our expec-
tations about buy-outs following Jensen (1989).
Our evidence relating to the influence of multi-
ple creditors is particularly interesting. The finding
that when there are multiple secured lenders, the
senior secured lender gains at the expense of other
secured creditors extends previous research that
secured lenders gain at the expense of unsecured
lenders. The finding that the presence of multiple
secured creditors is associated with lower scaled
receivership costs lends support to the view that
multiple creditors either have a stronger incentive
or more ability to exercise control over receivers’
fees than does a single creditor. We cannot exclude
the possibility that since banks lending to MBOs
tend to engage in repeat syndication with other
MBO lenders, the desire to maintain reputation is
an important influence on the behaviour of the par-
ties concerned.
Our study suggests areas for further research.
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Table 12
Variables associated with length of receivership
This table uses OLS regression to analyse the variables associated with length of receivership. Dependent vari-
able is defined as the natural log of total length of receivership in days. SALEMODE = 1 if going concern or
mixed sale; = 0 otherwise. MULTCRS = 1 if more than one secured creditor; = 0 otherwise. PROPPAID = pro-
portion of secured debt repaid by receivership. LOGDUE is the natural log of total secured debt repayable.
ECON = 1 if receiver appointed in 1994 or later; = 0 if appointed in 1993 or earlier. Figures in parentheses are
p values.
Variable Predicted sign
Number of cases 64
Intercept ? 6.011
(.000)
SALEMODE ? –0.133
(.281)
MULTCRS ? –0.229
(.070)
PROPPAID – 0.117
(.520)
LOGDUE + 0.202
(.000)
ECON – –0.442
(.001)
Adjusted R2 0.308
F 6.596
F (sig) 0.000
Note: The highest correlation among the independent variables is –0.364 between PROPPAID and LOGDUE.
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